The Decisive Campaigns of the Desert Air Force 1942-1945 by Evans Bryn

Author:Evans, Bryn [Evans, Bryn]
Language: eng
Format: azw3, epub, mobi
Tags: HISTORY / Military / Aviation
ISBN: 9781473834811
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Published: 2014-04-29T16:00:00+00:00

On 5 and 6 August a force of 121 B-17 heavy bombers, out of a total Strategic Air Force strength of 180, made the only heavy bombing attacks on Messina city and the road junctions leading into its centre. Two more, smaller, raids, by eleven B-25 medium bombers on 13 August, and twelve on 16 August, during the crucial evacuation days of 11 to 17 August, made insignificant impact. None of these bombing missions sank any Axis shipping, or much hindered their evacuation operations.

It was left to TAF and DAF to shoulder the major part of the attempt to stop the Axis evacuation. Some 89 per cent of all sorties flown were by tactical aircraft, in the main by light bombers at night by No. 205 Squadron RAF, and fighter-bombers in daylight at low level. Even so, only some 18 per cent of the 137 light bombers, and 721 fighters or fighter-bombers available, were committed to attacking Messina.34

On 11 August the Allied High Command decided to re-deploy the heavy bombing raids to a concentrated attack on German supply routes in mainland Italy. Meanwhile, to accelerate the extrication of their forces from Messina to Reggio, on 13 August the Axis began to operate daylight ferries across the Messina Straits. That very same day a maximum strength bombing group of 217 B-17, B-25 and B-26 bombers, with 140 P-38 fighter escorts, raided the railway marshalling yards at Rome.

It would be four days before the heavy bomber fleet could be regrouped and put back in the air. In that time the light- and fighter-bombers kept on trying to defy the flak, attempting to disrupt the evacuation. It was to no avail and, by 17 August, the round-the-clock daylight ferry service, transporting the Axis forces to Reggio, was completed.35 In a Dunkirk-like escape across the Messina Straits the Germans had preserved a force upon which they would be able to build a ferocious defence of southern Italy.

Despite losing as many as possibly 100,000 Italians deserting or surrendering to become PoWs, the Germans were able to evacuate a substantial part of their force by ferry from Messina to Reggio. Around 60,000 troops, 10,000 vehicles, and nearly 150 guns were able safely to cross the strait.36 A combination of mistaken strategic vision and poor co-operation between Allied commanders from Eisenhower down allowed the Axis forces to escape. Strategic bombing by the high-flying B-17s of the few approach roads to Messina and Reggio, either side of the Messina Straits, would almost certainly have prevented the ‘Dunkirk-like’ evacuation by the Axis. Unlike Dunkirk, however, a significant force with their vehicles, guns and equipment intact, had escaped. They would confront the Allies with renewed strength in mainland Italy.

Notes

1. Herington, op. cit., pp. 568–9.

2. Montagu, op. cit., pp. 51–85.

3. Brookes, Air War over Italy, p. 10.

4. Owen, op. cit., pp. 182–3.

5. Ibid., pp. 185–6.

6. Ibid; Belogi and Leoni, ‘Pantelleria’, in After the Battle, No. 127, 15 Feb 2005.

7. Molesworth, op. cit., pp.61–3.

8. Owen, op. cit., pp. 182–3.

9. Ibid., p. 187.

10. Brookes, op.

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